Production postmortemThe dog ate my request

time to read 3 min | 417 words

A customer called us, quite upset, because their RavenDB cluster was failing every few minutes. That was weird, because they were running on our cloud offering, so we had full access to the metrics, and we saw absolutely no problem on our end.

During the call, it turned out that every now and then, but almost always immediately after a new deployment, RavenDB would fail some requests. On a fairly consistent basis, we could see two failures and a retry that was finally successful.

Okay, so at least there is no user visible impact, but this was still super strange to see. On the backend, we couldn’t see any reason why we would get those sort of errors.

Looking at the failure stack, we narrowed things down to an async operation that was invoked via DataDog. Our suspicions were focused on this being an error in the async machinery customization that DataDog uses for adding non-invasive monitoring.

We created a custom build for the user that they could test and waited to get the results from their environment. Trying to reproduce this locally using DataDog integration didn’t raise any flags.

The good thing was that we did find a smoking gun, a violation of the natural order and invariant breaking behavior.

The not so good news was that it was in our own code. At least that meant that we could fix this.

Let’s see if I can explain what is going on. The customer was using a custom configuration: FastestNode. This is used to find the nearest / least loaded node in the cluster and operate from it.

How does RavenDB know which is the fastest node? That is kind of hard to answer, after all. It checks.

Every now and then, RavenDB replicates a read request to all nodes in the cluster. Something like this:

The idea is that we send the request to all the nodes, and wait for the first one to arrive. Since this is the same request, all servers will do the same amount of work, and we’ll find the fastest node from our perspective.

Did you notice the cancellation token in there? When we return from this function, we cancel the existing requests. Here is what this looks like from the monitoring perspective:

image

This looks exactly like every few minutes, we have a couple of failures (and failover) in the system and was quite confusing until we figured out exactly what was going on.

More posts in "Production postmortem" series:

  1. (12 Dec 2023) The Spawn of Denial of Service
  2. (24 Jul 2023) The dog ate my request
  3. (03 Jul 2023) ENOMEM when trying to free memory
  4. (27 Jan 2023) The server ate all my memory
  5. (23 Jan 2023) The big server that couldn’t handle the load
  6. (16 Jan 2023) The heisenbug server
  7. (03 Oct 2022) Do you trust this server?
  8. (15 Sep 2022) The missed indexing reference
  9. (05 Aug 2022) The allocating query
  10. (22 Jul 2022) Efficiency all the way to Out of Memory error
  11. (18 Jul 2022) Broken networks and compressed streams
  12. (13 Jul 2022) Your math is wrong, recursion doesn’t work this way
  13. (12 Jul 2022) The data corruption in the node.js stack
  14. (11 Jul 2022) Out of memory on a clear sky
  15. (29 Apr 2022) Deduplicating replication speed
  16. (25 Apr 2022) The network latency and the I/O spikes
  17. (22 Apr 2022) The encrypted database that was too big to replicate
  18. (20 Apr 2022) Misleading security and other production snafus
  19. (03 Jan 2022) An error on the first act will lead to data corruption on the second act…
  20. (13 Dec 2021) The memory leak that only happened on Linux
  21. (17 Sep 2021) The Guinness record for page faults & high CPU
  22. (07 Jan 2021) The file system limitation
  23. (23 Mar 2020) high CPU when there is little work to be done
  24. (21 Feb 2020) The self signed certificate that couldn’t
  25. (31 Jan 2020) The slow slowdown of large systems
  26. (07 Jun 2019) Printer out of paper and the RavenDB hang
  27. (18 Feb 2019) This data corruption bug requires 3 simultaneous race conditions
  28. (25 Dec 2018) Handled errors and the curse of recursive error handling
  29. (23 Nov 2018) The ARM is killing me
  30. (22 Feb 2018) The unavailable Linux server
  31. (06 Dec 2017) data corruption, a view from INSIDE the sausage
  32. (01 Dec 2017) The random high CPU
  33. (07 Aug 2017) 30% boost with a single line change
  34. (04 Aug 2017) The case of 99.99% percentile
  35. (02 Aug 2017) The lightly loaded trashing server
  36. (23 Aug 2016) The insidious cost of managed memory
  37. (05 Feb 2016) A null reference in our abstraction
  38. (27 Jan 2016) The Razor Suicide
  39. (13 Nov 2015) The case of the “it is slow on that machine (only)”
  40. (21 Oct 2015) The case of the slow index rebuild
  41. (22 Sep 2015) The case of the Unicode Poo
  42. (03 Sep 2015) The industry at large
  43. (01 Sep 2015) The case of the lying configuration file
  44. (31 Aug 2015) The case of the memory eater and high load
  45. (14 Aug 2015) The case of the man in the middle
  46. (05 Aug 2015) Reading the errors
  47. (29 Jul 2015) The evil licensing code
  48. (23 Jul 2015) The case of the native memory leak
  49. (16 Jul 2015) The case of the intransigent new database
  50. (13 Jul 2015) The case of the hung over server
  51. (09 Jul 2015) The case of the infected cluster