RavenDB 4.0Managing encrypted databases
On the right you can see how the new database creation dialog looks like, when you want to create a new encrypted database. I talked about the actual implementation of full database encryption before, but todays post’s focus is different.
I want to talk a out managing encrypted databases. As an admin tasked working with encrypted data, I need to not only manage the data in the database itself, but I also need to handle a lot more failure points when using encryption. The most obvious of them is that if you have an encrypted database in the first place, then the data you are protecting is very likely to be sensitive in nature.
That raise the immediate question of who can see that information. For that matter, are you allowed to see that information? RavenDB 4.0 has support for time limited credentials, so you register to get credentials in the system, and using whatever workflow you have the system generate a temporary API key for you that will be valid for a short time and then expire.
What about all the other things that an admin needs to do? The most obvious example is how do you handle backups, either routine or emergency ones. It is pretty obvious that if the database is encrypted, we also want the backups to be encrypted, but are they going to use the same key? How do you restore? What about moving the database from one machine to the other?
In the end, it all hangs on the notion of keys. When you create a new encrypted database, we’ll generate a key for you, and require that you confirm for us that you have persisted that information in some manner. You can print it, download it, etc. And you can see the key right there in plain text during the db creation. However, this is the last time that the database key will ever reside in plain text.
So what about this QR code, what is it doing there? Put simply, it is there to capture attention. It replicates the same information that you have in the key itself, obviously. But what for?
The idea is that users are often hurrying through the process, (the “Yes, dear!” mode) and we want to encourage them to stop of a second and think. The use of the QR code make it also much more likely that the admin will print and save the key in an offline manner, which is likely to be safer than most methods.
So this is how we encourage administrators to safely remember the encryption key. This is useful because that give the admin the ability to take a snapshot on one machine, and then recover it on another, where the encryption key is not available, or just move the hard disk between machines if the old one failed. It is actually quite common in cloud scenarios to have a machine that has an attached cloud storage, and if the machine fails, you just spin up a new machine and attach the storage to the new one.
We keep the encryption keys secret by utilizing system specific keys (either DPAPI or decryption key that only the specific user can access), so moving machines like that will require the admin to provide the encryption key so we can continue working.
The issue of backups is different. It is very common to have to store long term backups, and needing to restore them in a separate location / situation. At that point, we need the backup to be encrypted, but we don’t want it it use the same encryption key as the database itself. This is mostly about managing keys. If I’m managing multiple databases, I don’t want to record the encryption key for each as part of the restore process. That is opening us to a missed key and a useless backup that we can do nothing about.
Instead, when you setup backups (for encrypted databases it is mandatory, for regular databases, optional) we’ll give you the option to provide a public key that we’ll then use to encrypted the backup. That means that you can more safely store it in cloud scenarios, and regardless of how many databases you have, as long as you have the private key, you’ll be able to restore the backup.
Finally, we have one last topic to cover with regards to encryption, the overall system configuration. Each database can be encrypted, sure, but the management of the database (such as connection strings that it replicates to, API keys that it uses to store backups and a lot of other potentially sensitive information) is still stored in plain text. For that matter, even if the database shouldn’t be encrypted, you might still want to encrypted the full system configuration. That lead to somewhat of a chicken and egg problem.
On the one hand, we can’t encrypt the server configuration from the get go, because then the admin will not know what the key is, and they might need that if they need to move machines, etc. But once we started, we are using the server configuration, so we can’t just encrypt that on the fly. What we ended up using is a set of command line parameters, so if the admins wants to run encrypted server configuration, they can stop the server, run a command to encrypt the server configuration and setup the appropriate encryption key retrieval process (DPAPI, for example, under the right user).
That gives us the chance to make the user aware of the key and allow to save it in a secure location. All members in a cluster with an encrypted server configuration must also have encrypted server configuration, which prevents accidental leaks.
I think that this is about it, with regards to the operations details of managing encryption, . Pretty sure that I missed something, but this post is getting long as it is.
More posts in "RavenDB 4.0" series:
- (13 Jul 2017) The admin’s backdoor is piping hot
- (10 Jul 2017) Securing the keys to the kingdom
- (04 Jul 2017) Unbounded results sets
- (13 Jun 2017) The etag simplification
- (12 Jun 2017) Data subscriptions, Part II
- (09 Jun 2017) Data subscriptions, Part I
- (19 May 2017) Managing encrypted databases
- (11 May 2017) Working with attachments
- (10 May 2017) Attachments
- (08 May 2017) Full database encryption