A PKI-less secure communication channelImplementing the record stream
We now have managed to do a proper handshake and both client and server has a shared key. The client has also verified that the server is who they thought it should be, the server knows who the client is and can lookup whatever authorization such a client is ought to get. The next step we have to take is actually starting sending data over the wire. I mentioned earlier that while conceptually, we are dealing with a stream of data, in practice, we have to send the data as independent records. That is done so we can properly verify that they weren’t meddled with along the way (either via cosmic radiation or malicious intent).
We’ll start with the writing data, which is simple. We initiate the write side of the connection using CryptoWriter:
We allocate a buffer that is 32KB in size (16KB x 2). The record size we selected is 16KB. Unlike TLS, this is an inclusive size, so the entire thing must fit in 16KB. We need to allocate 32KB because the API we use does not support in place encryption. You’ll note that we reserved some space in the header (5 bytes, to be exact) for our own needs. You’ll note that we initialize the stream and send the stream header to the other side in here, that is the only reference for cryptography in the initialization. The actual writing isn’t really that interesting, we are pushing all the data to the buffer, until we run out of space, then we call flush(). I’ve written this code in plenty of languages, and it is pretty straightforward, if tedious.
There isn’t anything happening here, until we call to flush(RecordTypes.Data) – that is an indication to the other side that this is application data, rather than some protocol level message. The flush() method is where things gets really interesting.
There is a lot of code here, I know. Let’s see if I can take it in all, there are some preconditions that should be fairly obvious, then we write the size of the plain text value as well as the record type to the header (that part of the header will be encrypted, mind). The next step is interesting, we invoke a callback to get an answer about how much padding we should use. There is a lot of information about padding. In general, just looking at the size of the data can tell you about what is going on, even if there is nothing else you can figure out. If you know that the “Attack At Dawn” is 14 chars long, and with the encryption overhead that turns to a 37 bytes message, that along can tell you much.
Assume that you can’t figure out the contents, but can sniff the sizes. That can be a problem. There are certain attacks that rely on leaking the size of messages to work, the BREACH attack, for example, relies on being able to send text that would collide with secret pieces of the message. Analyzing the size of the data that is sent will tell us when we managed to find a match (because the size will be reduced). To solve that, you can define a padding policy. For example, all messages are always exactly 16KB in size, and you’ll send an empty message every second if there is no organic traffic. Alternatively, you may select to randomize the message size (to further confuse things). At any rate, this is a pretty complex topic,and not something that I wanted to get too much into. Being able to let the user decide gives me both worlds. This is a match to SSL_CTX_set_record_padding_callback() on OpenSSL.
The rest is just calling to libsodium to do the actual encryption, setting the encrypted envelope size and sending it to the other side. Note that we use the other half of the buffer here to store the encrypted portion of the data.
In addition to sending application data, we can send alerts to the other side. That is an protocol level error message. I’ll actually have a separate post to talk about error handling, but for now, let’s see how sending an alert looks like:
Basically, we overwrite whatever there is on the buffer, and we flush it immediately to the other side. We also set the alert_raised flag, which will prevent any further usage of the stream. Once an error was sent, we are done. We aren’t closing the stream because that is the job for the calling code, which will get an error and close us during normal cleanup procedures.
The reading process is a bit more involved, on the other hand. We start by mirroring the write, pulling the header from the network and initializing the stream:
The real fun starts when we need to actually read things, let’s take a look at the code and then I’ll explain it in details:
We first check if an alert was raised, if it was, we immediately abort, since the stream is now dead. If there are any plain text bytes, we can return them directly from the buffer. We’ll look into that as well as how we read from the network shortly. For now, let’s focus on what we are doing here.
We read enough from the network to know what is the envelope length that we have to read. That value, if you’ll remember, is the first value that we send for a record and is not encrypted (there isn’t much point, you can look at the packet information to get that if you wanted to). We then make sure that we read the entire record to the buffer. We decrypt the data from the incoming buffer to the plain_text buffer (that is what the read_buffer() function will use to actually return results).
The rest of the code is figuring out what we actually got. We check what is the actual size of the data we received. We may have received a zero length value, so we have to handle this.We check whatever we got a data record or an alert. If the later, we mark it as such and return an error. If this is just the data, we setup the plain text buffer properly and go to the read_buffer() call to return the values. That is a lot of code, but not a lot of functionality. Simple code is best, and this match that scenario.
Let’s see how we handle the actual buffer and network reads:
Not much here, just need to make sure that we handle partial reads as well as reading multiple records in one shot.
We saw that when we get an alert, we return an error. But the question is, how do we get the actual alert? The answer is that we store the message in the plain text buffer and record the alert itself. All future calls will fail with an error. You can then call to the alert() function to get the actual details:
This gives us a nice API to use when there are issues with the stream. I think that matches well with the way Zig handles errors, but I can’t tell whatever this is idiomatic Zig.
That is long enough for now, you can go and read the actual code, of course. And I will welcome any comments. In the next (and likely last) post in the series, I”m going to go over error handling at the protocol level.
More posts in "A PKI-less secure communication channel" series:
- (12 Oct 2021) Using TLS
- (08 Oct 2021) Error handling at the protocol level
- (07 Oct 2021) Implementing the record stream
- (06 Oct 2021) Coding the handshake
- (04 Oct 2021) The record layer
- (01 Oct 2021) design